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DENNIS J. PARKER* and W. R. DERRICK SEWELL**

Evolving Water Institutions in
England and Wales: An Assessment
of Two Decades of Experience
ABSTRACT
This paper traces the evolution of water institutions in England and
Wales since the 1963 Water Resources Act, and the development of
a much broader approach to water management than exists in most
parts of the world. Interestingly, the perspective on water services
has graduallyalteredfrom one based on local "welfare state" ideals
of collective provision andfinance to one in which water is viewed
more as an economic good to be supplied by business and market
oriented organizations. The government has declared its plans to
"privatize" the water industry and, while this step is yet to be taken,
there appears to be a growing acceptance of the idea that economic
rules should guide allocation, charges and prices. The adequacy of
water institutions in Englandand Wales is assessed using nine evaluative themes which relate directly to the various objectives of water
management.

INTRODUCTION
Water management in England and Wales has reached an important
new stage in its evolution representing a major change in direction. The
water industry there has been the subject of several major reorganizations
in recent times, occurring about once every decade. Beginning with the
introduction of the 1963 Water Resources Act,' and continuing with further legislation in 1973 and 1983, major alterations have been made in
policies and administrative structures. The areal focus has moved from
the local area to the larger, river-basin-based region. Water management
functions have become concentrated under one roof. Economic principles
have been introduced into pricing policies. Conscious attempts are being
made to integrate water policy with other areas of government policy.
During this period the financing of water management and the shape of
water institutions have become important political issues as the water
industry has been forced towards the center of the political arena.
The latest phase of change involves an attempt to remove the industry
from the public sector. Wishing to reduce its expenditures and to promote
*Reader in Geography and Planning, Middlesex Polytechnic, Enfield, United Kingdom.
**Professor of Geography, University of Victoria, British Columbia, Canada.
1. 1963 Water Resources Act, ch. 38.
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greater efficiency in public sector activities, in 1986 the Thatcher government began studies of the possibilities for, and the implications of,
"privatization" of the water industry. By mid-1986 it appeared to be
ready to make a major move in this direction by introducing legislation
in the fall of that year. After much discussion, in the House of Commons,
the media and elsewhere, however, the government decided to postpone
action until after the coming general election, due by the summer of 1988.
Meanwhile the debate continues. The government has reconfirmed its
intent to privatize the water industry. Even if privatization is not fully
introduced, it is certain that further important changes in water institutions
in England and Wales are in prospect. These will be of particular interest,
not only to water managers in the United Kingdom, but to planners and
policymakers elsewhere, notably in North America and Australia where
similar challenges are now being faced.
An important point in the evolution of the water industry in England
and Wales has been reached where it seems useful to pause and reflect
upon two decades of institutional change. What were the stimuli for such
a change? What was the intent behind the various modifications of legislation, policies, administrative structures and procedures? Have these
modifications succeeded? What are the problems that remain to be faced?
These questions provide the central focus for the discussion which follows.
EVALUATIVE THEMES
Laws, policies, and administrative structures and procedures provide
an institutional framework within which resources management decisions
are made. Such a framework changes over time, in response to pressures
from unresolved problems on the one hand, and the emergence of new
ideas and changing social values on the other. While in general change
tends to be slow and incremental, occasionally it is dramatic and "revolutionary."
In recent times there has been a good deal of discussion among economists, political scientists, geographers and others about the "adequacy"
of resource management institutions. This has been especially so with
respect to water resources. Of particular concern have been the procedures
for allocating water among alternative uses, the bases for setting prices
and charges, and coordination within and between levels of government
of the public in decisionmaking. 2 From the resulting literature has come
2. Much of the initial discussion focused upon economic aspects, and especially the management
of water resources in the United States. See, e.g., J. Hirschleifer, J. DeHaven & J. Milliman, Water
Supply: Economics, Technology and Policy (1960); J. Krutilla & 0. Eckstein, Multiple Purpose
River Development: Studies in Applied Economic Analysis (1958). It has since moved on to deal
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a variety of suggestions as to criteria that might be used to assess the
responsiveness of water management institutions to new challenges.
Fox and Craine addressed the issue of institutional criteria in the 1960s
and 1970s.' In their analysis, the concepts of unified river basin management and democratic decisionmaking figured importantly. They focused upon such matters as adequate legal powers for water management,
efficiency and equity in their design of water institutions. Subsequent
evaluations of water institutions frequently used one or more of these
criteria, 4 often redefining, molding and developing them to suit particular
studies and to generate new insights and explanations. 5
An analysis of previous work, together with a knowledge of themes
which are particularly pertinent to the mid-1980s, indicates that an evaluation of water institutions in England and Wales should be primarily
concerned with nine criteria, 6 which are discussed below. While these
criteria are considered to be of prime importance, they are not the only
criteria which could be used to assess the adequacy of water institutions.
Where relevant, other factors are also commented upon below. For example, the professional and disciplinary composition of water agency
staff is an important institutional factor which sometimes threatens to
constrain the adequacy of management. Thus water agencies should perhaps also be judged by their staff development and recruitment programs.
Some authors, such as Craine, 7 identify administrative flexibility as an
important criterion: whether the administrative system possesses the capacity to adapt to new ideas, information, resources and technologies,
and whether administrative discretion is provided for in the law. Others
ask whether the range of choice of solutions to water problems is adversely
with other dimensions and to address the situation in other countries. See, e.g., G. White, Strategies
of American Water Management (1969); E. Haefele, Representative Government and Environmental
Management (1973); J. Dales, Pollution, Property & Prices (1968); R. Johnson & G. Brown, Jr.,
Cleaning up Europe's Waters: Economics, Management and Policies (1976); Managing the Water
Environment (N. A. Swainson ed. 1976); Fox, Institutions for.Water Management in a Changing
World, 16 Nat. Res. J. 743 (1976).
3. Fox and Craine, Organizational Arrangements for Water Development, 2 Nat. Res. J. 1(1962);
L. Craine, Water Management Innovations in England (1969); Craine, Institutions for Managing
Lakes and Bays, II Nat. Res. J. 519 (1971).
4. See, e.g., L. James & R. Lee, Economics of Water Resource Planning (1971); B. Mitchell,
Water in England and Wales: Supply, Transfer and Management (1971) [Liverpool Univ. Dep't. of
Geography Research Paper 9]; L. Barr, Areal Organisation of Water Management in England and
Wales [Unpublished thesis, available at the University of Victoria, British Columbia] (1973).
5. See, e.g., A. Kneese & B. Bower, Managing Water Quality; Economics, Technology and
Policy (1986); D. Okun, Regionalization of Water Management (1977); E. Porter, Water Management
in England and Wales (1978); D. Parker and E. Penning-Rowsell, Water Planning in Britain (1980);
W. Sewell, J. Handmer & D. Smith, Water Planning in Australia: From Myth to Reality (1985).
6. E. Penning-Rowsell & D. Parker, Water Planning Institutions: Evaluating Current Arrangements
and Future Possibilities in Britain and Australia (1986) (Working Paper 83, Centre for Resource and
Environmental Studies, Australian National University, Canberra).
7. L. Craine, supra note 3, at 20-21.
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constrained, 8 while others question whether there are adequate administrative and planning linkages between water agencies at the local, regional and national levels.9
The River Basin Management Concept
The river basin or catchment area has become increasingly recognized
as a particularly appropriate areal unit for water management.'o For technical and economic reasons, hydrological boundaries are regarded by
those within the water industry, as well as by other professionals, as
strongly preferred boundaries for water management agencies.
The rationale for river basin management stems from the concept of
the river as an organic system characterized by physical linkages and
interdependencies which translate into economic ones." For example,
effluent disposal in one part of a catchment may well affect river water
quality at a downstream water abstraction point in the same catchment,
thus raising water treatment costs at that point-and in some cases possibly precluding abstraction. It is preferable, therefore, for the same
agency to manage both effluent disposal and water abstraction locations
and operations in order to minimize costs. In economists' terms, river
basin management is an attractive way of "internalizing externalities. ""
The main difficulty with establishing river-basin agencies is that existing
governmental agencies are usually required to surrender part of their
jurisdiction and powers to "outside" interests, thus forcing defensive
reactions in favor of the status quo. Also river-basin agencies add complexity to the overall political system.
Integrated Management of Water Functions
The success of catchment-based water management often depends upon
the extent to which the river-basin agency is legally empowered to manage
more than one primary water function within a given region. Thus, there
may be uni-functional and multi-functional basin agencies, but where
economic and social development is advanced, and demands upon water
and associated land resources are multifarious, a multi-function "integrated" approach is often advantageous. Conflicts inevitably arise between water functions, such as between power generation and recreation.
8. E.g. E. Porter, supra note 5; D. Parker & E. Penning-Rowsell, supra note 5, at 85-86; E.
Perning-Roswell. D. Parker & D. Harding, Floods and Drainage: British Policies for Hazard Reduction, Agricultural Improvement and Wetland Conservation (1986).
9. P. Herrington, Pricing of Water Services (1985) (Paper presented for OECD Environment
Committee Steering Group on Economic Aspects of Water Conservation).
10. White, A Perspective on River Basin Development, 22 Law & Contemp. Probs. 157 (1957).
11. Environmental Effects of Complex River Development (G. White ed. 1977).
12. A. Kneese & B. Bower, supra note 5, at 97-129.
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It may be argued that multi-functional agencies are in the best position
to reconcile these conflicts by coordinating provisions for each function.
Thus, in advanced economies the benefits of river-basin management are
most likely to be achieved when water management is also multi-functional. However, separation of functions is sometimes held to be superior
to integrated multi-functional management. Thus, where sewage disposal
and pollution control are at issue, it may be argued that the water environment is best safeguarded if these functions are managed by separate
agencies---one being able to prosecute the other for pollution offenses.
Adequate Legal Powers
Water management comprises a number of functions including data
collection and monitoring, planning, development, design and construction, operation, and regulation. There is considerable variation, however,
in the extent to which water agencies at different levels of government
have adequate legal powers at their disposal to undertake each of these
functions. 3 As society develops, becomes more complex, and becomes
more demanding of natural resources such as water, one could expect the
regulatory framework and incentive systems for efficient use to be developed progressively through legislation. For example, the ability of
water management agencies to regulate groundwater withdrawals is often
dependent upon legislation imposing a groundwater withdrawal licensing
system with powers to refuse permits where groundwater resources are
being depleted. Similarly, the ability of water agencies to operate economically efficient water supply charging systems depends upon these
agencies being legally empowered to install water meters.
Adequate Finance
Inadequate financing for water management is often the cause of failure
to improve, or delay improving, standards of water service. Financial
constraints may lead to deterioration in standards, and thus there is interplay between criteria. For example, the ability of water agencies to
safeguard the environment is often related to financial constraints. The
quantity of financial resources available to water agencies depends upon
many factors. For example, adequate legal powers must exist to raise
revenue through charges, and to borrow. Water agencies should be large
enough to be able to finance large-scale water resource developments
where such are required. They should also be able to subsidize the provision of nonmarketable environmental services, such as pollution control
and recreation and amenity, from marketable ones. Government economic
policy may control public sector expenditure, perhaps setting expenditure
13, L. Craine, supra note 3.
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ceilings and rate of return requirements upon water agencies. In some
instances private sector finance may have an important role in providing
water services.
Economic Principles
The economic perspective on water management is based on the recognition that providing water when and where consumers demand it
usually requires the use of economic resources. Therefore water is an
economic good. This perspective thus subsumes the concepts of economic
efficiency, consumer sovereignty and utility maximization.' 4 Thus, economic systems are designed to allocate resources in an economically
efficient manner. Economic instruments should therefore be designed to
answer questions such as: what goods and services should be produced;
what quantity and quality of these goods and services (including environmental ones) should be produced; and for whom should they be produced? Furthermore, it is argued that water should be managed to maximize
its net value in use, and allocation decisions should be left to "sovereign"
consumer's preferences.'
In most countries, water legislators and managers are seeking ways of
applying such economic principles to water management to ensure the
efficient conservation, management and allocation of water services. There
is, however, widespread recognition that the application of economic
principles does not, in itself, provide total solutions to problems which
must also involve social and political choices.
Testing for the sound application of economic principles involves investigating whether current resource allocation methods are economically
efficient and whether they are based upon utility maximization and consumer preferences. This leads to analysis of charging structures and whether
they encourage efficient resource allocation and whether, for example,
marginal cost pricing of water services is used. This line of analysis leads
to investigation of the degree to which water is charged for by volume
consumed, whether there are economic incentives to avoid waste, and
the extent to which the polluter is made to pay for pollution damage.
One may also ask whether projects and other water related investments
are appraised against economic efficiency criteria, as is sometimes done
in the use of benefit-cost analysis of water supply extension, flood mitigation, and pollution abatement projects.
Equitable Policies
Equity (or fairness) is a highly subjective concept. All definitions of
equity reflect a value judgment and the adoption of a political standpoint.
14. J. Rees, Natural Resources: Allocation, Economics and Policy (1985).
15. P. Herrington, supra note 9.
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The equity issue concerns whether or not water should be "socially"
priced (or subsidized) to ensure that its use is not inhibited by income
considerations, or whether or not water management should be a vehicle
for directing financial help to the poorer members of the community.
Thus, the equity issue is bound up with "income distribution" issues.
Where equity issues are concerned there are no right or wrong answers,
only social "political" choices. Thus, a "welfare state" water industry
model might well lead to subsidized water services, whereas a business
corporation model leads towards removing the responsibility of income
redistribution from the water industry and towards other government
policies, such as social security and taxation systems. 6
A variety of definitions of equity are possible. For example, water
service charges may be fixed according to at least three different equity
definitions. First, consumers can all be charged the same price for consuming a single unit of water. At first sight this appears equitable but
some consumers may place a higher cost upon the supply system than
others-which might be interpreted as inequitable. This leads to a second
definition of equity: consumers pay according to the cost which they place
upon the water supply system. Arguably, however, this is also unfair since
consumers living in say, peripheral rural regions, may place a higher cost
on water services than those living in central urban regions. A third
possibility is that consumers should pay according to their wealth. Thus,
the well-off would pay more than the less well-off. 7
The presence of income redistribution objectives within water policy
suggests an underlying equity goal. Charging structures may be analyzed
to determine whether or not they lead to inequity, however defined. A
different test of the equity of institutions or policies concerns whether or
not particular groups or individuals are arbitrarily or consciously discriminated against in terms of water charges, or the provision of services.
Conflicts often arise between the search for ways to apply economic
principles and the search for equitable policies, since what is equitable
is not always economically efficient. It is the balance which is struck
between these competing criteria which is of particular interest.
Environmental Protection
The water industry is not only concerned with the protection of the
aquatic environment but other environmental resources, such as landscape, which is impinged upon by water management. An important test
of water management institutions is the degree to which they safeguard
and protect environmental values, recognize the limitations imposed by
environmental considerations, and seek to modify, and sometimes, reject
16. Id. at 14.
17. D. Parker & E. Penning-Rowsell, supra note 5, at 85-86.
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policies which have adverse environmental impacts. The extent to which
environmental interests are represented, consulted and internalized within
the decisionmaking process, how far environmental impacts are taken
into account in development decisions, and whether environmental impact
techniques are employed, are all important measures together with the
more objective indicators of environmental quality improvement or decline. 8
Public Accountability
Public accountability in water management is becoming progressively
more important as water management develops from being not only a
technical issue but a key ingredient in economic and social policy and
influenced more and more by political considerations.' 9 Accountability is
the cornerstone of democratic government. In democracies the most important test of accountability is the degree to which decisionmakers-in
this case, water managers-are directly or indirectly answerable to the
electorate. A further test of accountability is the extent to which all relevant
interests are represented and involved in the planning process. Previous
research has either explicitly emphasized accountability2' or has dealt
with it more implicitly through recognition of the need for institutions to
be responsive to changing social values and needs. 2
There are many different forms of accountability ranging from direct
to indirect and local to central. Essentially, accountability is a political
mechanism and is one very important means by which representations
and decisions are made over spending. Often water managers prefer
technical considerations to dominate in decisionmaking. Thus, a strong
system of public accountability can interfere with the technical rationale
and cause frustration at the technical planning level. Therefore, public
accountability and technical efficiency sometimes conflict with each other
and it is the particular balance that is struck within any institutional system
which is crucial.
The Integrated Management of Water and Other Areas of
Government Policy
Ideally, different areas of government policy should be integrated so
that they work towards the same objective rather than negating or jeop18. E. Penning-Roswell, D. Parker & D. Harding, Floods and Drainage: British Policies for
Hazard Reduction, Agricultural Improvement and Wetland Conservation (1986).
19. W. Sewell, J. Handmer & D. Smith, supra note 5, at 244.
20. 1. Rees, supra note 13; E. Porter, supra note 5; A. Maass, H. Hufschmidt, R. Dorfman, H.
Thomas, S. Marglin and G. Fair, Design of Water-Resource Systems: New Techniques for Relating
Economic Objectives, Engineering Analysis, and Governmental Planning (1962).
21. L. Craine, supra note 3; L. Barr, supra note 4; C. Howe, The Design and Evaluation of
Institutional Arrangements for Water Planning and Management (1971) (Paper presented at United
Nations Conference, Mar del Plata, Mar. 24-25).
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ardizing each other.22 There are many areas of interface, for example,
between agricultural policy and water policy. As an illustration, unless
coordination takes place, agricultural policy on the use of fertilizers and
pesticides to increase agricultural profitability may work against water
policy designed to improve river water quality. Urban land-use development has major ramifications for the quality of urban watercourses.
Methods of policy coordination are clearly required. Similarly, flood
hazards are worsened by ill-advised flood plain development. Again a
system of coordination between flood mitigation and urban development
agencies is needed to reduce this problem. A key question is, therefore,
the extent to which the key interdependencies between water and other
government policies have been recognized, and the extent to which, in
consequence, policies are modified and management tools developed to
encourage policy integration.
POLICY EVOLUTION: 1963-1986
The present institutional framework for water management in England
and Wales has its roots in the 1963 Water Resources Act [1963 Act] and
the 1973 Water Act. The 1963 Act followed to varying degrees the
recommendations of the Central Advisory Water Committee [Committee],
which was set up in 1955 to review water policy. The Committee recognized several important weaknesses in existing institutions, including
the fragmentation of the water industry into thousands of small management units, and consequent difficulties arising from lack of coordination
among agencies.24 Coordination problems were of particular concern because of the growing scarcity of clean water sources close to major urban
areas. The Committee recommended a new approach embracing a consolidation of agencies, the introduction of economic concepts into water
policy, and the development of a national water policy. 5
The 1963 Water Resources Act was based broadly upon these principles
which also sowed some important seeds of change which finally brought
about the 1973 Water Act. The 1963 Act failed to accomplish a major
consolidation of agencies. Administrative structures in fact changed remarkably little. Although the number of water agencies was marginally
reduced, 1,597 agencies remained involved in the management of the
principal water functions. Most significantly, the 1963 Act left control of
the water industry in local government hands and continued the separate
management of sewage disposal and water supply functions. The former
continued as a local authority function, while the latter remained in the
22. A. Kneese & B. Bower, supra note 5; B. Mitchell, Geography and Resource Analysis (1979).

23. 1973 Water Act, ch. 37.
24. Gr. Brit. Central Advisory Water Committee, The Future Management of Water in England
and Wales (1971).
25. E. Porter, supra note 5, at 25.
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hands of statutory water undertakings (local authority agencies or private
water companies). 6
The main success of the 1963 Act lay in the highly significant change
of emphasis from single-purpose water management to a more integrated
approach, in which some of the most important water functions were
performed by the same catchment agency. Thus, the Act established 29
River Authorities with similar catchment boundaries to the 34 River Boards
which they replaced (Table 1). However, in addition to land drainage

TABLE 1
Key Events in the Evolution of Water Institutions in
England and Wales Since 1959
Date

Key event

Oct 1959
1963

Conservative govt. elected

Oct 1964
1965

Labor govt. elected
Water Resources Act 1963
implemented
Labor govt. re-elected

May 1966

Water Resources Act passed 29
River Authorities; 370 Statutory
Water Undertakings; 1327 local
authority sewage disposal
authorities; Water Resources
Board created

1969
June 1970
1971
1973
1973

Institutional response

Central Advisory Water
Committee re-established
Conservative govt. elected
Central Advisory Water
Committee report
Water Resources Board publishes
national water strategy (25)
Water Act passed
10 Multi-functional regional
Water Authorities (WAs);
recreation function added. 32
Water Companies (water supply
function); National Water
Council and Water Space
Amenity Commission created

26. Sewell & Barr, Evolution in the British Institutional Framework for Water Management, 17
Nat. Res. J. 395 (1977).
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TABLE I (continued)
Date

Key event

Institutional response

1974
Feb 1974
1974

Wate r Act 1973 implemented
Labo r govt. elected
lmpl ementation of COPA
delay'ed

Control of Pollution Act (COPA)
passed

1976

Government consultative
proposals (37) for a National
Water Authority; integration of
private Water Companies with
public sector Water Authorities*;
increase in local authority
membership of WAs; water
charges equalization proposals
Government decision to
implement 1976 proposals*
except for integration of Water
Companies. Water Charges
Equalization Act passed

May 1979
1979

Conservative govt. elected
Self-financing directive to
WAs

1980
June 1983

Internal reorganization of WAs
commences
Conservative govt. re-elected
Water Act passed. National
Water Council and Water Space
Amenity Commission dissolved.
Water Charges Equalization Act
repealed. Consumer Consultative
Committees introduced WA
board membership substantially
reduced

1983

1984
1985
Feb 1986

Annual rate of return set for
WAs by Minister
Review of land drainage
administration announced
Control of Pollution Act
1974 implemented

July 1986

Government announces
postponement of
privatization plans until after
next general election

1987July 1988

General election
announcement awaited.

*Proposals/decisions subsequently abandoned.

10 Water Service Public Limited

Companies to be created; Special
Public Bodies for land drainge
function
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(flood alleviation and agricultural drainage), pollution prevention, fisheries and navigation functions held by the River Boards, the new River
Authorities were given powers relating to water conservation, development, abstraction and forward planning. Under the 1963 Act, the River
Authorities were required to expand data collection, produce long range
assessments of future water supply and demand trends, introduce charging
schemes for financing water resource development, and license water
abstractions. In addition, the 1963 Act established a national Water Resources Board responsible for advising central government and the main
water agencies.
At the central government level a basic separation of responsibility for
national water policy between the local government Ministry (the Ministry
of Housing and Local Government which became the Department of the
Environment in 1970) and the agriculture Ministry (the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food) was consolidated by the 1963 Act. The
agriculture Ministry retained control of land drainage (including flood
alleviation) and fisheries, while all other water functions became the
responsibility of the local government Ministry.
The 1963 Water Resources Act did not go far enough in consolidating
water management units. The major flaw-the continued separate management of the "dirty" (sewage disposal) and "clean" (water supply)
sides of the water cycle-quickly surfaced during the late 1960s as a
major continuing coordination problem. The issue was exacerbated by
the increased reliance upon "dirty" lowland river sources as new "clean"
upland sites for water storage became increasingly difficult to .find, owing
in part to the increasing public concern about adverse environmental and
social impacts of reservoir developments.
The separation of powers for pollution control and sewage disposal
severely limited effective water quality management which was a major
option in the search for new clean water sources. The national water
strategy published by the Water Resources Board in 197327 was excessively constrained by lack of attention to the potential of water quality
management to solve water supply problems." Instead, the Board produced a plan which foresaw major water supply extension projects-a
plan soon to be shelved following the government's re-establishment of
the Central Water Advisory Committee in 1969 whose purpose was to
review institutional arrangements once again. The 1971 report of the
Central Advisory Water Committee set out several options for institutional
reform, including the further consolidation of water agencies.29
27. Gr. Brit. Water Resources Board, 2 Water Resources in England and Wales (1973).
28. See L. Craine, supra note 3.

29. Gr. Brit. Central Advisory Water Committee, supra note 24, at 295-314.
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During the late 1960s further deficiencies of the institutional arrangements became apparent? The continuation of numerous small management units constrained the achievement of economies of scale and economic
efficiency in water management. In addition, water-based recreation grew
rapidly, especially at inland sites. Apart from permitting the usage of a
number of water supply reservoirs for recreation, however, River Authority responsibilities for recreation and amenity developments remained
limited.
The 1973 Water Act: The "Revolution" in Water Management
The 1973 Water Act has been called a "revolution" in water management in England and Wales. 3' The Act established 10 Regional Water
Authorities-later known just as Water Authorities: nine in England and
one in Wales. The "revolution" lay in the "overnight" consolidation of
the functions of approximately 1500 management units into these 10 Water
Authorities on April 1, 1974 (Table 1). The Water Authorities replaced
the River Authorities and unified the management of the water cyclethis time including the "dirty" and "clean" sides of the cycle. Some 32
(now 28) private water companies were retained as single function water
supply agencies, providing about 22 percent of water supplies, yet these
companies became "agents" of the Water Authorities32. (see Figures 1 and

2).
Thus, the Water Authorities became regional-scale, river-basin-based,
multi-functional water management agencies operating on a "source-tomouth" management principle. Water Authority boundaries comprised
consolidations of former River Authority areas: no concession was made
to political pressures from Wales for an entirely "Welsh" Water Authority. 33 Thus, following the hydrological imperative, the Welsh Water
Authority's area excluded a major part of mid-Wales lying in the river
Severn catchment which came under the jurisdiction of the predominantly
"English" Severn-Trent Water Authority. Water Authorities are responsible for all of the water functions which are important in England and
Wales: water resource conservation, water treatment and distribution,
sewerage, sewage treatment and disposal, water quality regulation, pollution control, river management including flood alleviation and land
drainage, recreation and amenity, fisheries, and navigation. Within each
Water Authority a corporate management structure was established com30. Gr. Brit. Water Resources Board, supra note 27..
31. D. Okun, supra note 5, at 16.
32. D. Parker & E. Penning-Rowsell, supra note 5, at 35-36.
33. Broady, Welsh Water: The Politics of Water Supply, in Water Planning and the Regions, 9
Disc. Paper 19 (P. J. Drudy ed, Regional Studies Association 1977).
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FIGURE 1. The Catchment-based Water Authorities and the Water Companies
in England and Wales
Source: D. J. Parker and E. Penning-Rowsell, Water Planning in
Britain, 26 (1980).
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FIGURE 2. The Principal Water Management Agencies in England and Wales
prising a team of headquarter directors responsible for overseeing operations at the divisional (sub-regional) level.
The 1973 Water Act replaced the Water Resources Board with the
National Water Council, composed of the Chairmen of the 10 Water
Authorities together with appointees from the central government. The
National Water Council was an advisory body both to government and
to the water industry but did not have the research and planning functions
of its predecessor which went to the Central Water Planning Unit and the
Water Research Centre. In addition, to help push the water industry into
its new recreation and amenity role, the Water Space Amenity Commission was established to promote the development of water-based recreation. 4
A major feature of the April 1, 1974 water reorganization was the
removal of water management from local government. While each Water
Authority was given an executive board of up to 52 members, the majority
of whom were local authority appointees, water management was no
longer a local government function. Significantly, the financing of water
34. Gr. Brit. Water Space Amenity Commission, Who We Are and What We Do (1977).
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management was separated from local government.35 The Water Authorities inherited huge debts. No longer were water rates (that is charges)
subsidized by the local authority rate support grant from the central government-a change, which together with a move towards self-financing,
forced up water charges. 36
Amid the "revolution" one unchanging anomalous feature of water
management in England and Wales since 1930 can be recognized. The
1973 Water Act did not alter the overall "control" of land drainage by
the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF). While the Water
Authorities were given supervisory, maintenance and construction powers
relating to land drainge, the executive responsibility for administering
land drainage finance was delegated in the 1973 Act to Regional Land
Drainage Committees and their local counterparts,3 7 thus maintaining
control of "agricultural drainage" (though urban drainage and flood alleviation was included) in the hands of landowners and farmers who made
up the membership of these Committees. In England and Wales, central
government grant aid subsidy was given to farmers for drainage improvements in low-lying land with wet soils to enhance agricultural profitability.
The rigid defense of the status quo and the drainage subsidy system by
agricultural interests throughout the passage of the Water Bill through
Parliament is a story in its own right.3" Despite attempts to loosen the
control of agricultural interests over this aspect of water policy and to
concentrate central government responsibility for water policy in the Department of the Environment, the "community network" of mutually
supporting agricultural interests-an alliance termed "the MAFFia" by
their opponents--campaigned successfully to retain a distinctive administrative system for land drainage.39
The 1973 Water Act brought about more than just a "revolution" in
administrative and organizational structures. The Act reflected political
moves to reduce the "welfare state" systems of collective provision and
finance. In part, this reflected a fundamental economic change in Britain
in the late 1960s and 1970s associated with the declining profitability of
the nation's traditional industrial base, an aging population profile, and
questions about the affordability of "welfare state" services in the latter
part of the century. Thus, the Act initiated changes which have profoundly
affected the nature of the relationship between the water industry and its
35. Gray, Regional Water Authorities, in Regional Government in England (B. Hogwood and M.
Keating eds. 1982); Gray, Organisational Contingency and Water Authority Structure, (Middlesex
Polytechnic Geography and Planning Paper 3).
36. D. Parker & E. Penning-Rowsetl, supra note 5, at 84.
37. E. Penning-Rowsell, D. Parker, & D. Harding, supra note 18, at 35-37.
38. See A. Kneese & B. Bower, supra note 5.
39. Richardson, Jordan & Kimber, Lobbying, Administrative Reform and Policy Styles: The Case
of Land Drainage, Political Studies 47 (1978).
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clients. The Act moved the industry towards the philosophy of water as
an economic good rather than as a subsidized public health service. The
Act was based upon a managerial philosophy, upon a philosophy that
"bigger is better" and upon increased administrative efficiency and greater
economic efficiency-in short, upon "business" imperatives.'
1974 to 1979 and the Water Industry Review
The 1973 Water Act gave Water Authorities important water quality
regulation and nature conservation duties. Significantly, these were backed
up in the 1974 Control of Pollution Act, 4' known as "COPA," Part II of
which covers water pollution. Apart from significantly tightening the
control of polluting discharges to sewers and watercourses, through the
establishment of public registers recording pollution "consent conditions," the Water Authorities are themselves open to public criticism and
prosecution where their sewage treatment works fail to meet consent
conditions approved by the Secretary of State. However, although COPA
passed through Parliament in 1974, the implementation of major sections
of the Act was phased, and Part 11 was still not completely implemented
by 1986. Because of the additional pollution control expenditures necessary for the Water Authorities and industry to comply with the Act, the
latter was viewed as inflationary during a period when counter-inflation
policy was a major government priority. In addition, the implementation
delay allowed Water Authorities to "adjust" their sewage treatment works'
consent conditions so that they could avoid embarrassing criticism and
prosecutions.4 2
The 1974 to 1979 period witnessed proposals for further institutional
change in the water industry. However, with the exception of the 1977
Water Charges Equalization Act,4" few of these reforms actually materialized." This period demonstrates the growing tendency since the late
1960s for the water industry to be pulled to the center of the political
arena, with institutional proposals increasingly reflecting the progressively polarizing economic and political ideologies of the conservative
and labor parties.
The 1973 Water Act was introduced by a conservative government but
in 1974 a labor government was re-elected and remained in office until
1979 (Table 1). On gaining office the new government announced a full
40. Penning-Rowsell & Parker, The Changing Economic and Political Character of Water Planning
in Britain, reprinted in 4 Progress in Resource Management and Environmental Planning (T. O'Riordan & R. Turner eds. 1983).
41. 1974 Control of Pollution Act, ch. 40.
42. National Water Council, River Water Quality: The Next Stage: Review of Discharge Consent
Conditions (1978).
43. 1977 Water Charges Equalisation Act, ch. 41.
44. D. Parker & E. Penning-Rowsell, supra note 5, at 86-87.
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review of the water industry in England and Wales. This review was
published as a consultative document in 1976 inviting public comments."
The labor government's proposals' reflected traditional labor party concerns: a preference for state control through central authority with a
national strategy; devolution to the provinces; dislike of the private water
companies; local representation and accountability; and equity.
Accordingly, the government's proposals included the establishment
of a National Water Authority to replace the National Water Council, the
Water Research Centre and the Central Water Planning Unit, and the
development of a national strategy for water services. No specific changes
were proposed to the functions or the boundaries of the Water Authorities.
However, a new Welsh Assembly was to be responsible for water policy
in the whole of Wales and local accountability and representation was to
be strengthened with a 20 percent increase in local authority membership
of Water Authority boards. In the end the proposal that the private water
companies were to become state-owned was dropped. With the dramatic
rise in water charges during the mid-1970s wide variations in average
water bills for unmeasured, mainly domestic, supplies developed between
Water Authority regions. For example, in 1976 household water supply
bills ranged from 44 percent above the national average to 17 percent
below this average.47 Although these variations in part reflected different
historic debts faced by Water Authorities, they were considered unfair
and thus water charges were to be "equalized."
The only major institutional reform to materialize before the general
election of May 1979 was the passing of the 1977 Water Charges Equalization Act. The intent of this legislation was for water consumption in
high-cost areas such as Wales to be subsidized by low-cost areas, such
as the Thames region, where "equalization levies" appeared on water
bills. Difficulties were experienced, however, in operating the 1977 Act
and it was repealed by the conservative government in 1983. The labor
government's proposals to take the private water companies into state
ownership also foundered following a strong rearguard action by the
companies and the large amounts of compensation that it was claimed
would be necessary to integrate the companies with the public sector
Water Authorities. The regional devolution movement of the 1970s dissipated towards the end of the decade as proposals for Welsh and Scottish
Assemblies gained little public support.
During the labor government administration, public sector investment
45. Department of the Environment and Welsh Office, Review of the Water Industry in England
and Wales: A Consultative Document (1976).
46. Department of the Environment, Welsh Office and Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and
Food, The Water Industry in England and Wales: The Next Steps (1977).
47. D. Parker & E. Penning-Rowsell, supra note 5, at 83-84.
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in the water industry declined markedly, not least because of the reductions
in public expenditure which were forced in 1977-78 by the intervention
of the International Monetary Fund."
1979-1983: The First Thatcher Government and the
1983 Water Act
The main thrust of the conservative government led by Margaret Thatcher
has been to continue the transformation of the water industry in England
and Wales from a public service to a business organization49 ripe for return
to the private sector in what the present government hopes will be the
third Conservative administration of the 1980s.
The basis for achieving this goal was laid in the 1973 Water Act which
removed the industry from local political control and introduced the corporate management approach and search for efficiency. The Act set up
large Water Authorities capable of achieving significant economies of
scale, removed subsidies from water charges. The Act also made it possible to introduce a self-financing directive for Water Authorities, incorporated a clause by which Ministers could require Water Authorities to
earn a fixed rate of return on operations, and made it legally feasible to
introduce domestic water metering to enable economic principles to be
applied to water charging. From the end of 1979 onwards the water
industry came under "external" government-imposed pressures designed
to achieve the conservative government's economic policy goals. In many
respects these pressures were more important than legislation in generating
institutional change.
The first of these pressures has been the Thatcher government's monetarist economic policy. This has demanded the continued curbing and
cutting of public expenditure and the public sector borrowing requirement
so that inflation may be contained. Also, to arrest the declining profitability of British industry, the Thatcher government's philosophy has been
to shift the balance of the country's capital investment away from the
seemingly "unproductive" public services towards more "productive"
private industrial capital investment. The second pressure has been "cash
planning" and the setting of expenditure ceilings for the public sector, a
device to control overspending. By 1981 public sector investment in the
water industry in England and Wales had returned to the 1965-66 level"o
(Figure 3). Thirdly, from 1979 onwards the government began to progressively reduce the proportion of capital expenditure funded from bor48. Penning-Rowsell & Parker, supra note 40. at 189.
49. See A. Patterson, The Restructuring of Water Production and Consumption (1987) (Paper
presented at the Annual Conference of the Institute of British Geographers, Portsmouth, UK);
Penning-Rowsell & Parker, supra note 40, at 170.
50. Penning-Rowsell & Parker, supra note 40, at 191.
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FIGURE 3. Water Authority Capital Expenditure 1960 to 1985
Source: Penning-Rowsell & Parker, The Changing Economic and
Political Character of Water Planning in Britain, In Progress
in Resource Management and Environmental Planning 4 (1.

O'Riordan & R. Turner eds. 1983); The Chartered Institute
of Public Finance and Accountancy, the Water Industry UK
Service and Costs 1985 (1986).
rowing, with the intention of forcing Water Authorities towards financial
self-sufficiency. This was later followed when the government required
Water Authorities to earn a certain rate of return ("profit") on capital
invested to generate revenue to more rapidly pay off government loans,
thus again reducing the public sector borrowing requirement.
Further adjustments to institutional arrangements were made by the
1983 Water Act. Consistent with the conservative government's philosophy of improving administrative efficiency and tightening central government control over the water industry, the Act significantly reduced the
size of English Water Authority boards to between ten and fifteen, and
finally eliminated the requirement that local authority members be appointed.5 ' Instead Water Authorities were required to set up advisory
5 i. Kromme, Regional Water Management: An Assessment of Institutions in England and Wales,
37 Professional Geographer 183-91 (1985).

Fall 19881

WATER INSTITUTIONS IN WALES AND ENGLAND

consumer consultative committees to include local government representatives and different classes of consumers.
Consistent with the conservative government's apparent dislike and
abolition of many "quangos"---quasi-autonomous nongovernmental organizations-under the 1983 Water Act52 the National Water Council and
the Water Space Amenity Commission were also dissolved, removing the
national level advisory tier of agencies set up under the 1973 Water Act.
Instead, the Water Authorities Association, a kind of "trade association"
or water industry pressure group comprising the Water Authority chairmen, was set up.
Also, during the 1979-83 period Water Authorities underwent major
internal reorganizations designed to streamline their administration, reduce staff levels by up to 30 percent thereby paring costs, and introduce
business management techniques and retraining. To encourage comparison and efficiency, in the early 1980s the government also required Water
Authorities to regularly produce "performance indicators" at constant
prices for each of their services. Thus, performance targets or levels of
service could be incorporated into Water Authority plans.
During this period the conservative government sought a low profile
on environmental protection issues which were perceived as a force for
greater public expenditure. Thus, implementation of COPA Part II was
further delayed. Paradoxically, however, the water industry's duties for
environmental protection expanded during the early 1980s not least through
the enactment of the 1981 Wildlife and Countryside Act53 which lays
additional environmental protection duties on Water Authorities.
1983-1986: The Second Thatcher Government and Plans for
Water Industry "Privatization"
The latest period of change has been particularly turbulent. Arguing
that board meetings closed to the press are more efficient, in 1984 the
Water Authorities closed their meetings to the public. Internal reorganization of Water Authorities has continued apace, pressures for investment
and replacement of aging plants and equipment, particularly sewers and
water mains, have grown, yet real capital expenditure has been pegged
at about 1979-80 levels' (Figure 3). Pressures mounted from the European Commission for water quality control expenditures for United
Kingdom compliance with the 23 European Community "water directives."
52. Water Act, 1983.
53. Wildlife and Countryside Act, 1981.
54. The Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy, The Water Industry UK Service
and Costs 1985 (1986).
55. N. Haigh, EEC Environmental Policy and Britain (1984).
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During 1985 the chairman of the Thames Water Authority became the
principal water industry proponent of "privatization." He objected to the
government's continued interference in his Authority's affairs, especially
the government's financial policies. These policies, designed to finance

more capital investment from water charges, imposed an increase in water
charges more than double that required by the Thames Authority. After
a period of intense speculation and uncertainty, in February 1986 the
conservative government announced its plans to "privatize" the Water
Authorities in England and Wales.56 These privatization plans are part of
the Thatcher government's commitment to a private market philosophy
affecting British Airways; the gas, post office and telecommunication
industries, nationalized banks, hospitals and health care, and education.
The government's privatization plans have received a mixed reaction from
within the water industry but Water Authority chairmen antagonistic to
the plans have been replaced.
The plan to privatize the water industry envisages a progressive £6000M
stock market "flotation" of the Water Authorities, possibly beginning
with Thames Water Authority. The Water Authorities will become Water
Service Public Limited Companies operating within a regulatory framework (Figure 4).
Integrated river basin management will be retained, although controversial separate institutional arrangements are being debated for the
administration of land drainage, flood prevention and coast protection. 5"
Consistent with the application of economic principles to water management, large-scale domestic water metering is being studied and detailed
metering trials are being undertaken. Universal domestic metering is now
more probable since the government intends to reform the local rating
system, currently the basis for calculating charges for unmeasured public
water supplies.
POLICY EVALUATION
The evolution of water institutions in England and Wales between 1963
and 1986 has been more dramatic than in most countries. The extent to
which river basin management has been adopted is of world-wide interest.
It is therefore highly pertinent to evaluate the extent to which institutional
arrangements have succeeded. The nine evaluative criteria noted earlier

are employed here.
56. See Secretary of State for the Environment, Privatisation of the Water Authorities in England
and Wales (1986); Department of the Environment and Welsh Office, The Water Environment: The
Next Steps (1986) (The Government's Consultative Proposals for Environmental Protection Under
a Privatised Water Industry); Sewell, The Continuing Saga of British Water Management: "Privatization Shelved," Water News 2, 3-5 (1987).
57. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Financing and Administration of Land Drainage,
Flood Prevention and Coast Protection in England and Wales (1985).
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FIGURE 4. The Future Shape of the Water Industry in England and Wales,
under the Government's "Privatization" Plans
Source: Derived from Secretary of State for the Environment, Privatisation of the Water Authorities in England and Wales
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A Broader Perspective
During the past two decades, water management in England and Wales
has been transformed into a progressively broader field of activity. Similar
trends have been noted elsewhere.58 Not only have the responsibilities of
water management agencies expanded but the environmental implications
of water management have become more clearly recognized. Water management has become a more clearly political activity, not just because it
is distributive. As we have seen, water management has become progressively more affected by wider economic policies and ideological is-

sues.
The broadening of water management has necessitated a major change
in the professions represented among water managers. The narrow traditional technical, engineering and water science basis of water management has been replaced by one in which business executives, accountants,
and economists dominate. In England and Wales "technical" consider58. See, e.g., W. Sewell, J. Handmer & D. Smith, supra note 5.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol, 28

ations still dominate decisions, but increasingly these decisions now embrace economic and financial considerations.
These transformations have generated a consideration of a wider range
of options for solving water management problems. The potential of the
social sciences is now being recognized, if not always consciously so,
within the water industry. Technical, constructional options have been
complemented, and in some cases replaced, by economic and social ones
which are often more effective and cheaper to water agencies.
River Basin Management
Water management in England and Wales has benefited greatly from
adoption of river-basins as the boundaries of the regional-scale Water
Authorities. Importantly, the creation of river-basin agencies permitted
the progressive separation of water management from local government.
Before 1974, under local government control, water management suffered
decades of insufficient attention and finance. In consequence, the Water
Authorities inherited a seriously deteriorating sewerage and sewage treatment system which had been allowed to decline by local authorities more
intent on spending public money on the more "attractive" vote-winning
welfare services such as schools and housing. The creation of the Water
Authorities allowed water managers to be "bosses in their own house,"
enabling a more rational and effective setting of priorities.
Although both the River Authorities, established by the 1963 Water
Resources Act, and their successors, the Water Authorities, were river
basin agencies, the latter are significantly fewer in number and larger in
size than the former. Thus, the Water Authorities have been able to achieve
economies of scale-notably in sewage treatment, water supply, administration, research and training-which their predecessors found difficult
to achieve. The Water Authorities were also able, through their size and
their capability, to manipulate the entire water cycle and to overcome
two major droughts-in 1976 and in 1984. The flexibility of operation
afforded to the water industry by its reorganization in 1974, and the
security of supply created through regional water grids, provided considerable benefit.59
River basin management has not, however, been adopted in totality in
England and Wales. Although responsibility over some estuaries is divided
between authorities thus complicating water pollution control there, the
principal exception is the land drainage function. Areal jurisdiction for
flood alleviation is divided between the Water Authorities who have powers and responsibilities for "main" rivers (the principal arterial rivers and
their tributaries), and the local authority urban district councils who are
59. D. Parker & E. Penning-Rowsell, supra note 5, at 92-95.
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responsible for "non main" rivers (the small, local, urban streams). Thus,
in urban areas the responsibility for drainage is complex and the "sourceto-mouth" planning principle is compromised. Similar complexity exists
along the coastline where powers to mitigate sea flooding are divided
among Water Authorities and local authorities.' These areal divisions of
responsibility have led to coordination problems and "irrational" differences in standards of flood mitigation.
Integrated Management of Water Functions
The multi-functional approach established by the 1973 Water Act has
contributed heavily to the successful adoption of river-basin management
and vice versa. There is a general recognition that water management
must often fulfill a range of competing demands, and that optimal use of
resources is only attainable through simultaneous consideration of combinations of uses.
In England and Wales the major administrative and economic benefits
of the multi-functional approach have come through the coordination of
sewage disposal, water supply operation, and recreation and environmental protection on rivers. This has been achieved through the use of
river quality objectives. On each reach of every river is set a river water
quality objective-a quality standard to be met-according to the present
and anticipated future uses of the water. Thus, sewage treatment plant
and industrial discharge "consent conditions" for rivers are established
according to an assessment of need, taking into account water abstraction
and other uses, such as angling or wildlife. Furthermore, improvements
in river quality according to need can be coordinated with the alteration
of consent conditions and investments in improvement and renewal of
sewage treatment plants in order to minimize water abstraction, treatment
and supply costs. Thus, integrated management aids the targeting of
investments and permits river water quality standards to be adjusted "up"
or "down" according to judgments about need. However, while this
promotes economic efficiency it does not always favor environmental
improvement.
While the management of rivers is a major focus of the benefits of
integrated management, such benefits also extend to other areas. The
Water Authorities have extended the use of their reservoirs and gathering
grounds to recreationists. Unfortunately, though, the extent of water industry-led recreational developments has been constrained because the
majority of water space in England and Wales is in multiple private
60. E. Penning-Rowsell and P. Thompson, Coastal Erosion and Flood Control: Changing Institutions, Policies and Research Needs (1987) (Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the

Institute of British Geographers, Portsmouth).
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ownership. The benefits of integrated management are now being turned
to the estuaries, where there are major pollution problems, and to the
coasts where "bathing waters," as defined by the European Community,
require substantial upgrading mainly for amenity purposes through major
investments in sewage disposal.
Adequate Legal Powers
The progressive effect of the 1963 Water Resources Act, the 1973 and
1983 Water Acts, and the 1974 Control of Pollution Act Part 11 has been
to provide Water Authorities with powers ranging over all water management functions. The extent to which these powers are "adequate,"
however, is a matter of much debate. Proposals for privatization have
raised additional concerns in this respect.
Existing powers reflect progressive removal of private water rights and
the establishment of the powers of the state to control, and enforce the
control of, water withdrawals and polluting discharges. Through discharge
consent conditions Water Authorities now have largely adequate and wideranging powers to regulate the discharge of industrial and trade pollutants
and to make the polluter pay. Central government is, in turn, empowered
to control the Water Authority's own discharges from sewage treatment
works. Legal powers were implemented in 1986 to provide extensions
to controls to virtually all types of discharge into water-riverine, coastal
and estuarial. The powers of enforcement, including fines and imprisonment for offenses, have been strengthened under COPA.
Certain inadequacies in legal powers are identifiable. The protection
of groundwater sources from diffuse and indirect sources of contamination
is becoming a major problem requiring further legislation, possibly through
the creation of limited water source protection zones. On another matter,
although the 1973 Water Act permitted the Water Authorities to install
water meters, further legislation is required to permit domestic water
metering trials on a compulsory basis.
In England and Wales the major problems associated with legal powers
lie in the problem of monitoring and enforcement and the flexibility which
these powers afford. Monitoring and enforcement are labor-intensive processes and thereby problematic. The number of river pollution incidents
is rising.6" Moreover, flexibility is a double-edged sword. While it enables
Water Authorities to exercise discretion over say, the prosecution of polluters (where curtailment of pollution may be achieved instead by warning
and persuasion), it also enables the government and Water Authorities,
under severe financial pressures, to delay action. Government has been
61. Water Authorities Association, Water Pollution from Farm Waste, 1985: England and Wales
(1986); Department of the Environment and Welsh Office, River Quality in England and Wales 1985:
A Report of the 1985 Survey (1986).
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criticized over long delays in the full implementation of COPA and, in
turn, the flexibility this delay was designed to give the Water Authorities
to adjust their discharge consent conditions has also been criticized.
An increasingly important dimension of legal powers is European Community (EC) water legislation which currently comprises 23 "water directives" concerning water quality.62 The United Kingdom government
is obliged to comply with these measures and may be taken to the European Court if it fails to do so. The EC water directives will contribute
to the raising of environmental standards in England and Wales. They
have, however, received a mixed reception from government and the
water industry for being "unnecessarily stringent" at a time of public
expenditure restraint.
Finance
One of the major developing factors influencing water management
from the 1974 reorganization onwards, was growing financial stringency.
Initially this was a consequence of the removal of local government
subsidy of water charges coinciding with a period of inflation. Subsequently, reductions in public expenditure, first by the labor government
in 1978, and second through the conservative government's economic
policy since 1979 of progressively reducing public expenditure, have
forced radical reductions in Water Authority expenditure and investment.
Expenditure ceilings, external financing (borrowing) limits and rate of
return requirements have all significantly affected the availability of water
industry finance.
Financial stringency has forced a continued search for increased administrative and economic efficiency. First since 1979 water supply charges
have consistently risen at a rate greater than inflation. There is little doubt
that the Water Authorities are now more efficient than previously. Second,
the consequences for renewal and replacement of assets have been dire.
The inherited derelict, aging sewers of the inner cities, the under-capacity,
aging sewage disposal plants, and the aging water mains with growing
leakage problems, have in many areas not received the investment required to keep pace with the problems. The Labour Party and water
industry interest groups have repeatedly called for a major public works
investment program to renew sewers, but these calls to reflate the economy
have fallen on deaf ears. Through several reviews of discharge consent
conditions, the Water Authorities have revised downwards the consent
conditions of their sewage treatment works. There is continued high
incidence of sewer collapse and sewage flooding and water wastage problems. Programs for dealing with complaints about public water supplies,
62. N. Haigh, supra note 55.
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including discoloration, taste and odor, have been slowed down. Financial
imperatives have delayed the implementation of COPA and other environmental legislation. Water quality is deteriorating as a result.
Economic Principles
Since the early 1970s water services have been viewed increasingly as
economic goods. Unfortunately the movement of the water industry towards an economically efficient marginal cost pricing model for water
commodities has been slow.
An important step was the removal of the rate support grant subsidy
for water services following the 1974 reorganization. For the first time,
consumers began to pay more realistic water supply costs, although water
charges still varied according to the historic debts which Water Authorities
inherited. Domestic water metering has been recommended as a means
of improving efficiency. It has, however, been a source of frequent debate
within the water industry. In April 1985, 99.56 percent of domestic water
consumers still received unmeasured water supplies charged for according
to the "rateable value" (an assessed property value based upon market
rental value) of their houses. 3 Domestic water charges remain loosely
related to consumption. There is only a weak correlation between rateable
value and water consumption,' and domestic consumers have no economic incentive to control consumption or to avoid waste. From 1981
onwards the water industry introduced "option metering," by which domestic consumers pay for the quantity of water consumed, but only a
small number of consumers have chosen this method of payment. The
difficulties of moving away from a rateable value water charging system
are considerable and progress awaits further legislation, metering trials
and data collection. Universal domestic metering may still prove uneconomic but the water industry appears to be moving inexorably towards
a major65 extension of domestic metering and charging volumes consumes.
Since the 1963 Water Resources Act, abstractors of water from rivers
or aquifers have been licensed. From an economic viewpoint this licensing
system is inefficient. The withdrawal of licenses where they are underutilized is not legally possible and quantities licensed cannot be re-allocated to more productive uses elsewhere. Where there is competition for
abstraction licenses, and where industrialists are willing to pay more than
existing license holders, licenses cannot be switched. Since 1969 licensed
private water abstractors have been liable for an annual quantity charge.
63.
(1985)
64.
65.

Department of the Environment, Joint Study of Water Metering: Report of the Steering Group
[The "Watts" Report).
D. Parker & E. Penning-Rowsell, supra note 5, at 186.
Department of the Environment, supra note 63, at 5.
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These charges are related to the opportunity costs imposed by abstraction
by different types of users. Since 1974 abstraction charges have risen and
withdrawals have fallen markedly but this is probably explained more by
economic recession and factory closure than by a response of demand to
price increases.'
The expense of separately measuring and charging for wastes produced
by residential users of sewers is too great to warrant volume-related
charges. Thus, sewerage and sewage disposal charges are usually made
as standardized additions to water supply charges. Direct effluent discharges to rivers are controlled not through charges but through the imposition of standards by the setting of "consent conditions." The extent
to which the standards approach leads to an economically efficient allocation of resources is questionable. Charges for industrial discharges into
public sewers were introduced on a national basis in 1976, using a formula
which agreed with industrial interests. However, the role of the charging
system in increasing efficiency is unproven.67 Currently, there are no
charges for industrial discharges direct to watercourses. Even these place
a pollution control cost on Water Authorities. The government believes
that making the polluter pay for environmental damage caused by his
effluent is too difficult to administer. Thus, a simpler cost recovery system
is proposed for the future.68
The pressure to ensure value for money from projects and investments
has grown. Water Authorities are expected to assess investment programs
according to conditions laid down for "nationalized industries": that is,
a five percent real rate of return is to be achieved, and benefit-cost methods
are to be employed in project appraisal. However, the Monopolies and
Mergers Commission investigation of the Anglian and North West Water
Authorities69 found that for sewage projects benefit-cost appraisals suffered many shortcomings including exclusion of benefits, weaknesses in
the development and appraisal of options and, in some cases, failure to
cost options. A similar investigation of the Severn Trent Water Authority
in 1981 revealed that there were technical deficiencies in the use of project
appraisal methods and no systematic economic evaluation of leakage
control as an alternative to investment in water supply projects.7" However, benefit-cost methods were found to be systematically employed in
allocating flood mitigation expenditures."
66. J. Rees, supra note 14, at 295.
67. P. Herrington, supra note 15, at 7.
68. Department of the Environment, supra note 56, at § 6.
69. Monopolies and Mergers Commission, Anglian Water Authority and North West Water Authority: A Report on the Sewage Function of the Two Authorities (1982).
70. Monopolies and Mergers Commission, Severn-Trent Water Authority, East Worcestershire
Waterworks Company and South Staffordshire Waterworks Company: Report on Services Supplied
by the Authority and Companies (1981) (HC 339).
71. D. Parker, C. Green & P. Thompson, Urban Flood Protection Benefits: A Project Appraisal
Guide (1987).
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The adoption of the business approach to water management during
the late 1970s and 1980s has introduced fundamental changes in customerindustry relations. The government's privatization planse2 are designed
to extend the principles of the marketplace to the water industry in its
entirety in order to improve efficiency. Economic efficiency requires that
water services are allocated to those consumers who most value them,
where values are expressed as prices consumers are willing to pay. The
government's rationale is that private water companies will have greater
incentives to ascertain the needs and preferences of customers and to
tailor their services and charges accordingly. Access to private capital
markets, it is reasoned, will make it easier for water companies to pursue
effective investment strategies for cutting costs, and the financial markets
will be able to compare the performance of individual water companies
against each other and other sectors of the economy, thus providing further
impetus for performance improvement.
Equity
Since 1974, and with the removal of subsidies from domestic water
supply charges, the water industry has moved progressively away from
the concept of "socially" priced water services. The fact that "luxury"
uses of water now form a high proportion of total water consumption has
encouraged the view that income redistribution is not a water industry
responsibility-instead a "business" philosophy prevails. This is tempered by the 1973 Water Act which requires Water Authorities to ensure
that their water charges do not discriminate against any group in society.
Domestic water charges vary quite considerably between Water Authorities and Companies, reflecting differences in costs of supply. The Water
Authorities perform a difficult balancing act between setting charges which
go some way towards parity while also reflecting local differences in the
costs of supply and reducing economic inefficiency. The 1977 Water
Charges Equalization Act was a short-lived, and largely unsuccessful,
attempt to reduce differences in water charges defined as inequitable by
the then labor government.
Within water industry institutions in England, land drainage is anomalous. Subsidy, albeit reduced, remains available for urban flood mitigation projects and, currently lower priority, agricultural drainage projects.
Since, often through little fault of their own, urban residents discover
that they live in flood prone areas, there is arguably a case for subsidy.
However, in reality the continuation of subsidy is probably more related
to the power of the agricultural land drainage lobby. Urban flood miti72. Secretary of State for the Environment, supra note 56, at 1-3.
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gation projects are partly financed from local funds raised from all local
ratepayers. Since in England and Wales it is unusual for more than a
small minority of ratepayers to be flood prone, the local financing of a
flood mitigation project involves redistribution of income towards the
flood prone. A conflict between equity and economic efficiency objectives
is currently being faced in the allocation of grant aid for urban flood
alleviation projects. Standard of living and property value differentials
between the north and the south in England and Wales have grown in
recent years. Thus, it is often economically efficient to spend more upon
alleviating flooding in wealthier southern communities because flood damage potential is greater. However, this leads to differential alleviation
standards and equity issues. So far Water Authorities have chosen not to
pursue strict economic efficiency criteria but pressure is now growing for
greater weight to be given to economic efficiency considerations.73
Environmental Protection
The net impact of water policy on environmental protection over the
past two decades is difficult to assess but there have been some disturbing
trends since the late 1970s. Through the 1973 Water Act and the 1981
Wildlife and Countryside Act, the Water Authority's nature conservation
and environmental protection responsibilities have been strengthened and
expanded. Environmental protection powers have also been strengthened
through COPA. Whereas the 1973 Act only required the Water Authorities
to "have regard" for conservation, the 1981 Act made the duties of Water
Authorities more specific and made consultation with conservation bodies
a statutory requirement.
However, the policy of public expenditure restraint and the financial
stringencies affecting the water industry produced delays in implementing
environmental protection legislation, notably COPA and European Community laws such as the bathing water quality Directive. These delays
also allowed some sewage treatment plant discharge consent conditions
to be altered downwards with clearly negative environmental impacts.
After a long period during the 1960s and 1970s when river water quality
improved, the mid 1980s are witnessing a net decline in river water quality
in some regions and a growing farm waste pollution problem.74 Falling
rates of investment may also be leading to declining public health standards. Between 1979 and 1983 the average weekly number of cases of
73. D. Parker, Principles of Urban Flood Alleviation Benefit-Cost Analysis (1986) (Paper presented at Seminar on Flood Protection and Land Drainage, Hydraulics Research Ltd., Wallingford,
UK).
74. See Water Authorities Association, supra note 61; Department of the Environment and Welsh
Office, supra note 56, at 19-27.
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dysentery and diarrhea tripled and may be related to the decay of urban
water supply and sewer systems.75
On the other hand, through the establishment of conservation guidelines, Water Authority land drainage projects are now more environmentally sensitive than previously. Even so, Water Authorities often fail to
recognize the nature conservation opportunities provided by their reservoir
and other facilities. Non-marketable environmental services including
water quality regulation, pollution alleviation, recreation and amenity,
fisheries and navigation, have all been substantially subsidized by the
"marketable" services of Water Authorities-a principle to which the
government stated its continuing commitment in 1986.76 Whether the size
of this subsidy is large enough remains a matter of intense debate.
Public Accountability
During the past 15 years local accountability of the water industry has
been progressively dismantled. Prior to the 1973 Water Act, local government councilors had this responsibility. The creation of the Water
Authorities in 1974 and the "removal" of water management from local
77
government was the first major step in reducing local accountability.
Even so, until the 1983 Water Act, a majority of Water Authority board
members were appointed from local government (although because of
the large number of local government units many were not directly represented on boards). The 1983 Water Act was the final "nail in the coffin"
of local control, as the requirement for local government members to be
appointed to boards was finally eliminated.
The water industry in England and Wales is now characterized by a
system of central "ministerial" accountability-arguably a system inherently inferior to local accountability because of greater remoteness
from "local" consumers (Table 2). This model has developed as part of
the government's plans to control public expenditure and to lay the basis
for water industry "privatization." All Water Authority board members
are now appointed rather than elected to the new "streamlined" boards.
The consumer consultative councils are advisory bodies and lack "teeth."
However, during the 1980s government has chosen to make greater use
of the Monopolies and Mergers Commission to investigate the efficiency
of the water industry and to determine whether individual Authorities are
operating in the public interest. As in many areas of public policy in
Britain, there is now greater use of Parliamentary Select Committees to
investigate water policy.
75. Johnson, Old Drains and Diseases, New Statesman, 9-10 (1985).
76. Department of the Environment and Welsh Office, supra note 56, at § 2.15.
77. D. Parker & E. Penning-Rowsell, supra note 5, at 247.
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TABLE 2
The Principal Public Accountability Mechanisms of the Water Industry in
England and Wales in 1987
1. Water Authorities are accountable to Parliament through the Secretary of State for the Environment and the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food.
2. Ministers have power of direction.
3. The government sets external financing limits, capital investment limits and performance aims.
4. Water Authorities are subject to investigation by Parliamentary Select Committees and the
Monopolies and Mergers Commission.
5. Water Authority board members are appointed by Ministers.
6. The form of borrowing is determined by government.
7. The annual plans of Water Authorities are submitted for approval by Ministers and the annual
report is laid before Parliament.
8. The Water Authorities are subject to public audit.
9, The discharge consent conditions of Water Authority sewage treatment works and results of
monitoring of discharges are available for inspection in public registers.
10. Water Authorities are advised by statutory consumer consultative councils.

Integration with Other Areas of Government Policy
Recognition of the need to integrate water policy with other areas of
government policy has grown." Agriculture and water policy is proving
a particularly problematic area where there is a major need for policy

integration. For many years agricultural policy has been geared to increased farm output. Expansion has been encouraged and driven by a
wide range of price supports, subsidies and government grants. Farmers
have received incentives to drain wetlands and to "improve" farm land.

The environmental effects of these policies in terms of wetland loss have
been dramatic. 9 During 1984, under pressure from conservationists and
the public unpopularity of European Community food surpluses, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food changed its policy towards grantaiding wetland drainage. Agricultural drainage is now a low priority and

farmers are being compensated to continue traditional farming practices
rather than "improving" their land through drainage. Progress has therefore been made in creating wetland conservation and agricultural policies
which are more mutually supportive rather than conflicting.
During the past two years strenuous efforts have been made by the
Department of the Environment to halt the growth in river pollution from
78. Parker, Integration of Water Policy with Other Government Policies: UK Country Overview,
Report for OECD Environment Committee (1987).
79. E. Penning-Rowsell, D. Parker & D. Harding, supra note 18, at 120.
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farm wastes.' Even though the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and
Food is jointly responsible for promoting national water policy, the agriculture ministry has been reluctant to agree to measures designed to
reduce the pollution problem. Nitrate concentrations in water supplies
have steadily increased posing threats to public health. An inter-departmental committee is about to report on remedial measures.
A liaison system exists between Water Authorities and local planning
authorities over developments likely to increase surface water runoff and
developments in flood risk areas. This liaison system appears to have
avoided some of the more extensive flood plain developments which
would have otherwise occurred, but there is growing evidence that incremental flood plain development continues causing flood loss potential
to rise."
NEW CHALLENGES: 1987 AND BEYOND
As of mid-1987 the water industry in England and Wales finds itself
part way through a major institutional transformation which has its roots
in the 1960s. This transformation has already witnessed the creation of
river-basin based multi-functional agencies, the demise of the locally
controlled public health service oriented water industry which was part
of the post-war "welfare state," and its replacement by a regional-state
controlled business management oriented industry bent on introducing
economic and financial imperatives into water management. If the Thatcher
government is elected to a third term, the next major step is likely to be
"privatization" which will be the basis for the "completion" of the transformation. Whatever happens, the water industry now looks certain to
continue to be well and truly at the center of the political arena.
Whether privatized or not, the water industry faces several major challenges. Much of the physical plant is run down--owing to inheritance
and reduced spending-and the prospects of replacement are not bright
in most regions. Water charges have risen consistently above the rate of
inflation and there has been adverse public reaction. Environmental quality standards have come under great pressure and standards have fallen
in some areas. Though much has been achieved in improving water quality
in some regions, the record of the 1980s is much less impressive and
discharge consent conditions for many sewage treatment works have been
slackened. Also, to some extent river water quality improvement has been
80. Water Authorities Association, supra note 61.
81. Parker & Penning-Rowsell, Flood Hazard Research in Britain, 7 Progress in Human Geography, 182 (1983).
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achieved at the cost of moving the areal incidence of the problem--from
the rivers to the estuaries and to the coasts.
Despite the growing acceptance of a business management philosophy,
the introduction of economic principles into water management has been
slow. It seems certain, however, to continue. The more rigorous pursuit
of economic efficiency increasingly raises problematic equity implications
and thus political choices. There is no universal agreement that the present
emphasis on economic profitability should be the main consideration in
decisionmaking. While privatization may solve some of the problems of
the water industry, it clearly cannot be relied upon as a panacea for dealing
with all of them. Whether consumers will receive a better service from
a privatized water industry remains very much in the balance.
CONCLUSION
The Thatcher government called the awaited general election for June
1987, one year earlier than necessary, and succeeded in being returned
for a third term with a large majority. Since then the government has
confirmed its intention to "privatize" the water industry. However, the
"privatization" proposals published in July 19872 reflect a radical rethink
following intense lobbying. The industrial lobby believes that one private
company should not be allowed to regulate the polluting discharges of
other private industrial companies, and the environmental lobby has raised
serious questions about private water companies serving shareholder's
interests also being responsible for water quality regulation.
The government's revised proposals envisage the creation of state-run
National Rivers Authority which will take the responsibility for "regulatory" functions including those relating to water resource planning,
pollution control, land drainage, fisheries and some recreation and conservation duties. The remainder of the water industry-the "utility" functions such as water supply and sewage disposal unencumbered by regulatory
and environmental functions-will be "privatized." These latest proposals herald the reformation of integrated river basin management which
the Thatcher government found so attractive eighteen months earlier.8"
Ironically, the chairman of Thames Water Authority-the leading proponent of "privatization" of the water industry and a strong supporter of
integrated river basin management-now finds himself being the most
outspoken critic of the government's new proposals.
82. Department of the Environment, The National Rivers Authority--the Government's Proposals
For a Public Regulatory Body in a Privatized Water Industry (1987).
83. Secretary of State for the Environment, supra note 56.

